



Passkeys & Verifiable Digital Credentials: Friends or Foes?

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Quick Intro



Identity Standards @ Okta



Digital Credentials



Boston



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Agenda



- Refresher: what are passkeys and VDCs?
- What are **passkeys** are really good at?
- What are **VDCs** are really good at?
- Challenges with VDCs
- Bringing them together




REFRESHER

What are passkeys?



What is a passkey?



public / private key pair

phishing-resistant
(verifier name binding)

standards-based


pairwise
(unique per account + service)

device-bound or synced
(synced available by default)

used via the **WebAuthn API**
(and platform native interfaces)



What is a passkey?






REFRESHER


What are verifiable digital credentials?

Verifiable Digital Credentials

fundamentally a
**signed set of
claims**



Verifiable Digital Credentials



Trending Types



Government Identity

Driving License

eID

Passport



Travel Documents

Boarding Pass

Visa

Authorizations



Proof of Employment

Education

Certification

Income

Insurance



What are **passkeys** really good at?



Passkeys are really good at...

authenticating users

purpose built for authentication

they don't do much else (which is a feature!)

Availability

One type,
few parameters

“Give me a passkey pls”

```
{  
  "challenge": "...718sA",  
  "timeout": 60000,  
  "rpId": "login.example.com",  
  "userVerification": "preferred"  
}
```

Natively supported on
nearly every user device
in the world




estimate is >95%

Windows 10+

macOS 13+

Android 9+

iOS 16+





What are **verifiable digital credentials** really good at?



VDCs are really good at...

**giving users control of
identity data disclosure**

purpose built for user-centric control



Challenges with verifiable digital credentials

OpenID4VP

18013-7 Annex B

VC API

18013-7 Annex C

mdoc

18013-7 Annex A

SD-JWT

Digital Credentials API

AnonCred

DIDComm

W3C VC DM

SD-CWT

OpenID4VCI



Many Elements



Credential formats

Schema / Type

Presentation
protocols

Key types

Issuance protocols

Signature formats


Transports

Encryption methods



Availability

Due to the specific combinations of credential formats, engagement methods, transport protocols, and presentation / issuance protocols, **it's improbable that a user already has a supported credential provider installed and ready.**






Availability


VDCs are currently, and likely to remain, mobile-centric in the short to medium term (especially for medium to high assurance credentials).

This means cross-device flows are necessary for laptops and desktops, which have tested poorly with users for passkeys.





PRIVACY VDCs as a Super Cookie



Alcohol Delivery Device Key

Airline Device Key



Bank Device Key




COLLUSION

PRIVACY

VDCs as a Super Cookie



PRIVACY VDCs as a Super Cookie



Alcohol Delivery License #

Airline License #

Bank License #




COLLUSION



#identiverse

PRIVACY

VDCs as a Super Cookie



Potential Solutions

- Selective Disclosure**
(requires user to understand impact)
- Verifier Registration & Policy/Legal**
(challenging in some geos)
- Zero Knowledge Proofs & Pseudonyms**
(still very new)

PRIVACY

“Show Your Papers” Web

Sign In

A government issued ID
is required to stream.


VERIFY WITH YOUR
Digital ID




[What is a Digital ID?](#)

[Don't have a Digital ID?](#)

Bringing Them Together



Consumer




*federation -or-
VDCs*

sign up




passkeys

sign in



VDCs


proof up



*federation -or-
VDCs*

recovery

Workforce (employees & contractors)



VDCs
**sign up
onboard**



passkeys
sign in



VDCs
proof up



VDCs
recovery



Summary

- **Passkeys** for privacy preserving authentication!
- **VDCs** for user-controlled claims presentment!
- **Friends** not *foes*!

THANK YOU!



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A CRA  Resource